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The last years have witnessed a remarkable rise in interest in natural resource scarcity
and its long-run economic consequences. There are widespread concerns that dimin-
ishing resource input will have negative eﬀects on our long-run living-standards. If
economic growth were indeed impaired by lower resource use, this would particularly
aﬀect recently developed economies, which have grown heavily in energy-intensive sec-
tors. Moreover, resource-intensive sectors in the leading economies would be expected
to suﬀer most and possibly to vanish in the long run.
To counteract resource scarcity, improvements in technology are the most powerful
mechanism. Several recent papers have shown that long-run growth may be compat-
ible with the essential use of non-renewable resources, once we assume endogenous
technological change, see Barbier (1999), Scholz and Ziemes (1999), and Grimaud and
Roug´ e (2003, 2005). This literature uses a single ﬁnal output framework, which is
convenient but sidesteps the relationship between sectoral structure and aggregate
growth. This is a limitation, since the economies are specialized in diﬀerent sectors
and aggregate development depends on sectoral growth. In particular, one could ex-
pect that technological progress is faster in resource-extensive sectors, that sectors
exhibit diverging growth rates, and that economies specialized in resource-intensive
sectors achieve lower development paths.
The paper shows that, contrary to the common beliefs, resource-intensive sectors
conduct more research and increase eﬃciency faster than the rest of the economy.
Second, we demonstrate that the resource-intensive sectors are able to sustain output
in the long run, because the declining input of natural resources is compensated by
suﬃciently rising eﬃciency. We show the existence of a balanced growth path and
provide conditions for saddle-path stability of the system. This holds true even when
learning externalities in the research sector are purely sector-speciﬁc. In addition, we
demonstrate that the share of resource-intensive sectors can be constant in the long
run, as proﬁt incentives induce a more-than-proportional research eﬀort in these sec-
tors. Finally, we conﬁrm that increasing resource scarcity need not hamper economic
growth, even when sectors have large diﬀerences in resource use.
The model assumptions are based on empirical regularities. In reality, sectors
diﬀer substantially in terms of input intensities, speciﬁcally with regard to knowledge
intensity and natural resource use, which is crucial for the kind of disaggregation used.
Second, sectors oﬀer signiﬁcantly diﬀerent investment opportunities and innovations
are often sector-speciﬁc. Third, policies directed at speciﬁc sectors are very popular
and often implemented in practice.
We show that under the these empirically relevant assumptions, incentives arise
1from the rising scarcity of resource-intensive goods to invest relatively more in R&D in
the resource-intensive sector. Consequently, the composition of consumption in terms
of productivity-weighted sectoral goods remains constant along a balanced growth
path. Our results are in line with predictions of international organizations and recent
empirical observations. The International Energy Agency (IEA) emphasizes that the
largest potential for improving future energy eﬃciency lies in the energy-intensive
sectors (IEA 2008, p. 112). Moreover, it sees good development perspectives for
emerging economies despite their increasing shares of energy-intensive sectors (IEA
2008, p. 115). Along the same lines, Demailly and Quirion (2008) ﬁnd that energy-
intensive industries have performed much better economically under strict climate
policies than previously expected.1
We study the implications of various policies such as resource taxes, labor and
research subsidies and the sectoral, productivity enhancing provision of public goods.
We look at the eﬀectiveness of these policies in lowering resource use and raising
growth, i.e. promoting ‘sustainable’ development. Interestingly, the results are mixed.
In particular, research subsidies have positive growth eﬀects in both sectors but re-
source taxes aﬀect dynamics only when the tax rate varies over time. It is also shown
that sectoral policies might not induce the desired eﬀects, and that the sectors targeted
by policies may not matter for the actual policy eﬀects. For example, a sector-speciﬁc
provision of public goods that aims at increasing the share of the targeted sector, will
not raise but lower the share of this sector. And, although the growth eﬀect of public
good provision is positive, this result is independent of the sector in which the goods
are provided.
The paper is related to recent literature on innovation, growth, and resource use.
The basic technology assumptions for the diﬀerent sectors in the model are based
on Romer (1990).2 By stressing the role of sectoral research activities and directed
technological change, we apply the theory of factor-induced technical change, as in-
troduced by Hicks (1932) and applied by Acemoglu (2002), to economic sectors and
determine the conditions for sector-induced research. Smulders and de Nooij (2003)
and Di Maria and Valente (2008) are closest to our approach. However, these papers
do not assume that natural resources and labor are employed in all the diﬀerent sectors
of the economy. Moreover, we introduce labor reallocation between the diﬀerent pro-
1For an extensive overview of the literature dealing with applied approaches to technological change
and environmental policy, see e.g. Jaﬀe et al. (2002) and references within.
2This is similar to Bretschger and Pittel (2005) who consider a multi-sector economy with sector-
speciﬁc natural resource use but without directed technological change, as the substitution elasticity
between sectoral outputs is assumed to be unity. Withagen (1999), Pittel (2002), and Xepapadeas
(2002) provide surveys on the impact of natural resource use on economic growth. The impact of
natural resource use in dynamic multi-sector models is also treated by Peretto (2008) and Bretschger
(2008).
2duction and research sectors, which realistically allows for more ﬂexible adjustments
in the economy. Due to this endogeneity, policies can aﬀect the speed of resource
extraction as well as aggregate research activities - both of which are crucial for the
dynamics of the economy.3 Our approach is also close to papers where heterogeneous
sectors cause ongoing structural change, see Kuznets (1957), Kongsamut et al. (2001),
L´ opez et al. (2007), and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008). Compared to this literature
we introduce a new kind of multi-sector economy suited to discuss the direction of
technical change and development under natural resource constraints. We show that
despite the heterogeneity of sectors, long-run growth might not be accompanied by
structural change. In extension of the literature we also study implications of diﬀerent
types of policies that aim at supporting sustainability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model
in detail. The short and long-run dynamics of the model are analyzed in Section 3.
Section 4 deals with the eﬀects of policies striving at increasing the share of resource
extensive sectors and fostering sustainability, i.e. raising growth and lowering resource
extraction. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In our economy, horizontally diﬀerentiated goods are produced in two sectors – a
resource-intensive and a resource-extensive sector. In each sector, the diﬀerenti-
ated goods are assembled to sectoral outputs which are consumed by the households.
Blueprints for new products are developed by sector speciﬁc research activities and sold
to monopolistic producers in each sector. Besides natural resources, labor constitutes
the second primary input, which is employed in research as well as in intermediate
production. Sectors diﬀer with respect to resource intensity of production. We con-
sider inﬁnitely living households that maximize lifetime utility. Savings are either in
the form of investment in bonds or in R&D.
2.1 Production
Sectoral output The outputs of the two sectors, ˜ X and ˜ Z, each consist of a contin-
uum of horizontally diﬀerentiated intermediate goods, xi, i ∈ [0,n], and zj, j ∈ [0,m],
3Smulders and de Nooij (2003) take the supply of energy as exogenously given. We extend their
approach by endogenizing the dynamics associated with the input of non-renewable natural resources.
Di Maria and Valente (2008) endogenize the supply of inputs, capital and resources, but again do not
assume that all inputs are used in the diﬀerent sectors. They conclude that long-run development
is characterized by resource-augmenting technological progress only. For the case that the economic
sectors employ all the inputs and only diﬀer with respect to input intensities, we are able to show
that every sector conducts R&D in the long run. The direction of technological change is endogenous
and depends on the degree of heterogeneity with respect to resource intensities.
3where n and m denote the number of varieties in the respective sectors.4 Gains from
specialization arise, i.e. the larger the variety of goods, the more productive the
aggregate:5
˜ X =






and ˜ Z =







where 0 < β < 1.
The index of consumption C reﬂects households’ preferences for sectoral output.
Alternatively, C could be interpreted as aggregate output of the economy as, for













, ν > 0, ν  = 1 (2)
where ν denotes the elasticity of substitution between ˜ X and ˜ Z. For ν < 1, ˜ X
and ˜ Z are complements while they constitute substitutes for ν > 1. This implies
that for ν < 1 both sectoral outputs are essential.6 We abstract from Cobb-Douglas
preferences, i.e. ν = 1, as in this case sector shares would not be endogenously
determined.
To facilitate calculations without loss of generality, we choose the consumption
good to be the numeraire of the system so that its price is unity, i.e. pC ≡ 1. At each
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C and 1 − φ =
p ˜ Z
˜ Z
C denoting the expenditure shares of ˜ X and ˜ Z, such
that the relative sector share of x-goods is given by ˜ φ, which will prove to be a very
useful variable below.
Competition in x- and z-production is monopolistic. Each type of good is produced
by only one ﬁrm that has to acquire the according patent ﬁrst. x- as well as z-
intermediates are produced from labor L and non-renewable resources R using the
following Cobb-Douglas production technologies:
xi = (Lxi)
α (Rxi)
1−α and zj =
 
Lzj
 δ  
Rzj
 1−δ (4)
4For notational convenience the time index will be suppressed whenever no ambiguity arises.
5In contrast to the productivity adjusted aggregates, ˜ X and ˜ Z, we denote aggregate physical
amounts of xi and zi by X =
R n
0 xidi and Z =
R m
0 zjdj. The prices for ˜ X and ˜ Z are p ˜ X and p ˜ Z. pxi
and pzi on the other hand denote prices for individual goods.
6 Please note that resources are essential in our model for ν < 1 as well as for ν > 1 since they are
essential inputs in the production of ˜ X as well as ˜ Z.
4with 0 < α,δ < 1. Lk and Rk, k = xi,zj, denote the input of labor and resources
in the production of xi and zj. It is assumed that sectors diﬀer with respect to their
resource intensities, i.e. α  = δ.7
Maximization of proﬁts gives the ﬁrst-order conditions for the input of labor and
resources in the two sectors. Considering that xi = x and zj = z in the symmetric
equilibrium gives the sectoral demands for labor and resources in terms of ˜ φ and C:
LX = αβ
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C
w
and LZ = δβ
1
1 + ˜ φ
C
w
RX = (1 − α)β
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C
pR
and RZ = (1 − δ)β
1






0 Rkdi and LK =
  l
0 Lkdj, (K,l,k) ∈ (X,n,xi),(Z,m,zj). w and pR
denote the wage rate and the price of resources. Individual ﬁrms’ demands are ob-
tained by dividing the respective sectoral demands by the ‘number’ of intermediates
in each sector, i.e. n and m respectively. Summing up the resource demands of the
two sectors in (5) gives the aggregate extraction of resources at each point in time:
R = RX + RZ = ((1 − α)˜ φ + (1 − δ))
β




From (5) and the production functions for x and z, (4), sectoral equilibrium proﬁts
from intermediates production can be derived:
ΠX = (1 − β)
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C and ΠZ = (1 − β)
1
1 + ˜ φ
C. (7)
R&D Blueprints for new types of goods are generated in two separate R&D sectors.
The only rival input to research is labor, yet production also proﬁts from past research
activities which give rise to positive sector speciﬁc spill-overs. Production is linear
in labor as well as in research experience which equals the ‘number’ of blueprints















with Ln and Lm denoting the input of labor to sectoral research. a represents the
unit input coeﬃcient of labor in research which is assumed to be equal in the two
7 We abstract from α = δ as this case does not not provide much insight beyond the existing
literature. In the long-run, the relative sector share, ˜ φ, is equal to unity and the model collapses to a
model with only one intermediates sector (as e.g. analyzed by Scholz/Ziemes 1999, Schou 2002 and
Grimaud et al. 2009). The only diﬀerence to this type of model arises with respect to transitional
dynamics as, in case the initial number of intermediate goods diﬀers in the two sectors, sectoral R&D
activities are not identical outside the balanced growth path.
5sectors. In order not to predetermine sectoral convergence by the model assumptions
we exclude spill-overs between the sectors.8
Given the four diﬀerent uses of labor, equilibrium in the labor market requires
LX + LZ + Ln + Lm = 1 (9)
where, for simplicity, the size of the labor force is normalized to unity.
Research markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive, such that in equilibrium








Furthermore, equilibrium on the patent market requires the value of a patent to be
equal to the discounted stream of proﬁts generated by the production of the respective
intermediate good which implies the following no-arbitrage conditions to hold:
˙ Vn = rVn − Πx and ˙ Vm = rVm − Πz (11)
where r is the interest rate on all assets. Πx =
ΠX
n and Πz =
ΠZ
m stand for individual
intermediate ﬁrms’ proﬁts; ΠX and ΠZ are given in (7).
Resources Natural resources are non-renewable. The resource stock S is depleted
by the extraction of resources R for production, such that the dynamics of the resource
stock are
˙ S = −R. (12)














8Labor is taken to be the only rival input in R&D as assuming that resources were also an input
in research would aﬀect the quality of long run growth (semi-endogenous instead of fully endogenous
growth, see Groth/Schou 2007) but not the results on sectoral behavior which is the focus here.
9gb denotes the growth rate of variable b, i.e. gb =
˙ b
b, where ˙ b is the time derivative of b.
62.2 Consumers
Households derive utility from consumption C. The representative household maxi-






s.t. ˙ W = rW + w − C
where W = nVn + mVm + pRS denotes total household asset holdings. We assume
utility to be logarithmic in order to simplify the exposition (see Smulders and de Nooij
2003 and Di Maria and Valente 2008 for similar set-ups). Households supply labor
inelastically. From the ﬁrst-order conditions of household maximization we get the
familiar Keynes-Ramsey rule
gC = r − ρ. (16)
3 System Dynamics
To analyze the dynamics of the economy we reduce the system to two ﬁrst-order
diﬀerential equations which are functions of the relative sector share, ˜ φ, and the input
of labor in intermediates production of sector z, i.e. LZ.
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Proof. see Appendix A1.
These two equations describe the dynamics of the system along the balanced
growth path (BGP) as well as during the transition to the BGP. Inspection of (18) re-
veals immediately that the elasticity of substitution between the two sectoral outputs,
ν, is crucial for the dynamics of the system. As will be shown later in this section, the
switch in the sign of ˜ φ that arises for ν ≶ 1 causes instability of the system for ν > 1
while the economy is saddle-path stable for ν > 1.
With respect to long-term growth, a path will be called a BGP if all variables
grow at constant – possibly zero or negative – rates. This implies that along a BGP
7(i) aggregate production and production in both intermediate sectors grow at the
same rate and (ii) expenditure shares, sectoral labor inputs and the interest rate are
constant over time ( ˙ ˜ φ = ˙ LZ = ˙ r = 0).
For the BGP values of LZ and ˜ φ we get (see Appendix A2):
L∗
Z =
δ (1 + 2aρ)
δ + ˜ φ∗α +
1 − β
β










2 (1 + 2aρ) − aαβ2δρ
 




2 (1 + 2aρ) − aαβ2δρ
 
+ a(α − δ)β(1 − β)ρ + aα2β2ρ (22)
where asterisks indicate variable values or growth rates along the BGP.10
As to be expected, the direct eﬀect of labor productivity in the z-sector, δ, on L∗
Z
is positive while the direct eﬀect of α is negative. Also the discount rate, ρ, exerts a
positive direct eﬀect as higher impatience induces households to allocate less labor to
research and more to today’s goods production. Equally, the reaction of L∗
Z to β and
˜ φ∗ follows intuition: higher gains of specialization, i.e. a lower β, and a higher relative
sector share of x-products, ˜ φ∗, lead to a lower input of labor into z-production.
With respect to ˜ φ∗, (20) reﬂects that the gains of specialization, the productivity of
R&D as well as the discount rate aﬀect both sectors symmetrically. ˜ φ∗ only deviates
from unity due to α  = δ. Yet, whether ˜ φ∗ reacts positive or negative to a rise in
either α or δ depends crucially on the parametrization of the model. A rise in α,
for example, increases on the one hand labor productivity in the x-sector, which
ceteris paribus aﬀects ˜ φ∗ positively. On the other hand the rise in α decreases the
productivity of resources which lowers ˜ φ∗. Yet, less productive resources also render
z-products scarcer, therefore increase z-prices and induce higher incentives to invest
in n-R&D both of which increase ˜ φ∗. Which eﬀect dominates, depends crucially on
the parametrization.
The equilibrium input of labor into x-intermediates can be derived from (5):
L∗




10In contrast to Acemoglu/Guerrieri (2008), optimization on markets leads to long-run balanced
growth in our model. Acemoglu and Guerrieri assume R&D to be subject to decreasing or negative
spill-overs from knowledge in which case non-balanced growth arises. In our paper, however, R&D is
linear in knowledge in which case the two sectors grow at the same rate.
8(23) shows that the share of labor allocated to x- rather than z-intermediates rises
with the relative sector share and labor productivity in the x-sector.
From the no-arbitrage conditions for the patent market follows that along the BGP
the following relations hold (see Appendix A2):
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Complementing the results on LX and LZ, we see that a c.p. higher ˜ φ∗ induces an
allocation of labor towards R&D that develops new patents for the x-sector while the
input of labor into both research sectors rises with higher gains of specialization.
The growth rate of resource extraction along the BGP can be determined by
expressing the aggregate demand for resources, (6), in growth rates and considering
the Keynes-Ramsey rule, (16). This gives
gR = −ρ. (26)
Diﬀerentiation of (2) conﬁrms that balanced growth requires consumption and the
production of x- and z-aggregates to grow at the same rate, i.e.
g∗
C = g∗
˜ X = g∗
˜ Z. (27)
Identical constant growth rates of ˜ X and ˜ Z together with (3) imply that the sectoral
expenditure shares, φ and 1 − φ, as well as the relative expenditure share, ˜ φ, are
constant over time.
The condition that along the BGP aggregate production in both sectors has to
grow at the same rate carries important implications for research eﬀorts in equilibrium.
Considering the production technologies for x and z, (4), as well as (26), the growth












m − (1 − δ)ρ. (29)
Proposition 1. Along the balanced growth path, research is biased towards the re-




9Proof. From (28), (29) and g∗
˜ X = g∗
˜ Z along the BGP follows straightforwardly that
the following relation holds:
g∗





This condition states that for balanced growth to be feasible, diﬀerences in resource
intensities between sectors have to be compensated by research. It can also easily be
seen that in case that sectors are identical, innovation rates along the BGP are the
same in the two sectors. If, however, sectors diﬀer with respect to resource intensities,
more research will be conducted in the sector that is more resource intensive and thus
subject to a stronger drag from declining resource inputs.
While the aggregate productivity weighted amounts of goods produced in both
sectors, ˜ X and ˜ Z, grow at the same, potentially positive rate in equilibrium, the
physical amounts individual intermediates produced in either sector, x and z, decrease
over time. Taking into account that labor shares are constant along the BGP, it follows
from (4) and gRi = gR = −ρ that
g∗
x = −(1 − α)ρ < 0 (31)
g∗
z = −(1 − δ)ρ < 0. (32)
The reduction in the produced amounts is due to the decreasing input of natural
resources. If the z-sector is more resource intensive than the x-sector, z falls faster
than x. As economic intuition suggests, it follows from (3) that the price ratio follows
a time path that is inverse to the development of quantities, i.e. prices in the more
resource intensive sector rise faster due to increasing resource prices.
















− (1 − δ)ρ. (33)
with L∗
n and L∗
m being speciﬁed in (24) and (25). Overall, the sign of gC in (33)
is ambiguous. Two forces determine whether long-term development is sustainable
(gC > 0): −(1 − α)ρ and −(1 − δ)ρ represent the negative growth eﬀects stemming











reﬂect the growth stimulating eﬀects of research.
10After substituting (19), (24) and (25), g∗





aβ − β(α2 + δ2)ρ
2 − β(2 − α − δ)
− ρ. (34)
The resulting expression shows that consumption growth along the BGP can be neg-
ative if research is not suﬃciently productive (high a), such that the drag on growth
from resources overcompensates improvements in productivity from research. Simi-
larly, growth might be negative if agents are highly impatient. With respect to changes
in resource intensities, eﬀects on growth are ambiguous. A decrease in resource inten-
sity (increase in α, resp. δ) induces on the one hand a less severe drag on growth, but
on the other hand causes a reallocation of labor away from research.
Let us ﬁnally consider the transitional dynamics of this economy.
Lemma 2. The system given by (17) and (18) is locally saddle-path stable for ν < 1,
i.e. when ˜ X and ˜ Z are complements, and unstable for ν > 1, i.e. when ˜ X and ˜ Z are
substitutes.
Proof. see Appendix A3.
The result that for ν > 1 the system is unstable corresponds to the recent litera-
ture, see e.g. Acemoglu (2002) who also provides an intuitive explanation of which we
only provide the gist. If ˜ X and ˜ Z are complements (ν < 1), both goods are essential
such that R&D will be biased towards the scarcer, i.e. more expensive, product. Con-
sequently, if the initial share of a product is lower than its equilibrium share, it will
rise over time towards the BGP. If, however, ˜ X and ˜ Z are substitutes (ν > 1), R&D
will be biased towards the product with the larger than equilibrium share, inducing a
development away from the BGP. In this paper we are able to show that the stability
properties described by Acemoglu also hold in the presence of sectoral heterogeneity
with an essential non-renewable resource.11
4 Policy analysis
In Subsection 3 we have derived that growth depends on research eﬀort and resource
use. Growth eﬀects of policy can therefore stem from either higher innovation rates
and/or slower resource extraction. Yet, alternative policies not only diﬀer with respect
11 It can be shown that our results, regarding the existence of a BGP as well as the stability
properties, can be extended to economies in which sectors diﬀer with respect to research productivity
(an  = am) and/or gains of specialization (βx  = βz). Higher gains of specialization in sector x (i.e.
βz > βx) would, for example, imply an even stronger bias towards z-research. For more details, see
Appendix B.
11to the channels through which they aﬀect growth, but also with respect to their impact
on the sectoral structure.
In the following we consider diﬀerent types of policies that might constitute alter-
natives for a policy maker.12 In this section we assume throughout that α > δ, i.e.
that the x-sector is less resource intensive. We check diﬀerent policies with respect
to their ability to foster growth, to slow down resource extraction and to aﬀect the
sectoral structure of the economy. For those policy variables for which the tax or
subsidy level has no impact on the dynamics of the economy, we check for possible
eﬀects of time-varying tax/subsidy schedules. Speciﬁcally we focus on
• resource taxation (tax rate τ)
• labor subsidization (subsidy rate sw)
• diﬀerentiated research subsidization (sn and sm)
• diﬀerentiated provision of productive public goods (shares µx, resp. µz, of con-
sumption).
In case of time-varying policy instruments, gi denotes the growth rate of the
respective policy variable i.
The analysis of the policy instruments is conducted in two steps. First, the tradi-
tional instruments, i.e. taxes and subsidies, are analyzed in Subsection 4.1 while the
provision of public goods is treated in Subsection 4.2.
4.1 Policy analysis 1: Taxes and Subsidies
In the following we consider ad valorem taxes on the input of resources as well as
uniform subsidies on labor and diﬀerentiated subsidies on research. Research subsidies
are in the form of wage subsidies.
To clearly distinguish the eﬀects of each instrument, we assume in the following
that the government can balance its budget via lump-sum taxation or subsidization
of households. In this case, policies are not tied together by budgetary requirements
and each instrument can be analyzed independently.
12We focus on policy instruments and targets that are currently discussed in the ﬁeld of energy and
climate policies rather than on optimal policies. The optimum is quite simple to detect because the
only market failures actually included in the model are monopolistic competition in the intermediate
sector and the externality from the research sectors which are well studied in the endogenous growth
literature, see Romer (1990). Here we concentrate on the question whether the measures to save on
resource use and to support resource-extensive sectors work as commonly assumed or are ineﬀective
or even counter-productive.
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D1 = β(α − δ)(ρδβ(¯ sm − 1) + g¯ τ(1 − β + ¯ smβδ)) (37)
D2 = −β(α − δ)(ραβ(¯ sn − 1) + g¯ τ(1 − β + ¯ snβα)). (38)
For notational convenience we denote ¯ τ = 1 + τ, ¯ sm = 1 − sm and ¯ sn = 1 − srn. We
retrieve the no-policy BGP values of the two variables by setting ¯ sm = ¯ sn = 1 and
g¯ τ = 0.



















Z − aρ. (40)
For the BGP rate of resource extraction we get
g
p1∗
R = −(ρ + g¯ τ). (41)
By employing the above BGP relations we can now derive the comparative statics of
the diﬀerent policy instruments.
Proposition 2. If resource tax rates, τ, and labor subsidies, sw, are constant over
time, they have no impact on long-run growth, resource extraction and the relative
sector share. Research subsidies, sm and sn, aﬀect growth as well as the relative














Tax rates that change over time aﬀect long-run growth, resource extraction and the










dgτ < 0. (43)
13 For the derivation of the underlying dynamic system, see Appendix C1.
14As resource taxes are assumed to be ad valorem taxes on the input of resources, tax rates which
are continuously increasing and at some point exceed unity are feasible.
13Labor subsidies do not eﬀect long-run growth, resource extraction and the relative










dgsw = 0, (44)




C as determined by (35), (36), (39),
(40) and (41) with respect to the policy variables yields either zero or the above signs
(see Appendix C2).
Resource taxation only aﬀects long-run growth and the sectoral structure if the
rate of taxation changes over time. If τ is constant, resource taxation lowers resource
demand permanently by a constant factor while intertemporal arbitrage of resource
owners remains unaﬀected. As a consequence, the producer price of resources declines
leaving the price that intermediate’s producers have to pay unchanged. Thus constant
taxation exerts neither an eﬀect on resource and labor allocation nor on the speed of
resource extraction. A rising rate of resource taxation, however, alters growth via
two channels. An increase in taxation induces the speed of resource extraction to
rise as resource owners foresee the future decrease in the non-taxed share of resource
revenues. The resulting negative eﬀect on growth is naturally stronger in the more
resource intensive sector. To compensate for this stronger resource drag, labor is
allocated towards research in this sector. However, the resource extraction eﬀect
dominates such that the overall eﬀect remains negative. These ﬁndings are in line
with resource models that comprise single ﬁnal goods sectors, see e.g. Groth and
Schou (2007), which reveals that they continue to hold in the case of heterogeneous
sectors. We additionally show how the adjustment mechanisms work with multiple
sectors. In intermediates production, labor is reallocated towards the more resource
intensive sector. Due to the tax induced faster increase of intermediates’ prices in z-
production, the value share of the z-sector rises which raises proﬁtability and thereby
attracts labor from the x-sector and lowers ˜ φ.15
Labor subsidization has no eﬀect on growth and sector structure - neither for
constant nor for rising subsidy rates. The intuition is, that as labor inputs in all
sectors are equally aﬀected by the subsidy, no labor reallocation is induced.16 The
level of research subsidy rates aﬀects the allocation of labor in our model as it distorts
the production cost ratio between intermediates production and research. This eﬀect
corresponds to the standard results of endogenous growth theory, see Romer (1990).
15Empirical evidence that taxes on oil have been rising considerably during the last decades is
presented by Daubanes (2009). The current Swiss example of an announced rise in CO2 -taxes is an
example for anticipated tax increases.
16This neutrality result depends of course on the assumption that there is no labor-leisure choice
in our model.
14We add to the literature by analysing the direction in which research subsidies change
the relative market shares in the multi-sector economy. This depends on whether
the more or the less resource intensive sector is subsidized. Subsidies to research in
the less resource intensive sector (sn) induce the relative sector size of this sector to
decrease - and vice versa for the more resource intensive sector. The line of reasoning
is equivalent to the case of resource taxation presented above. Research subsidization
exerts no eﬀect on resource extraction in our model. Although the interest rate and
therefore the growth rate of the resource price change due to subsidization, the rate
of extraction remains unaltered as income and substitution eﬀects of interest rate
changes on the savings decision of households cancel.
4.2 Policy analysis 2: Productive public goods
The present framework is especially suited to study sector speciﬁc policies. As a second
policy option we thus consider ﬁnancing activities that enhance the productivity of
resources in either one or both sectors. The productivity improvement is assumed to
result from investing in the public provision of sector speciﬁc infrastructure, which
requires a sector-speciﬁc formulation of the approach of Barro (1990) and Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992).
For simplicity we again assume that the ﬁnancial revenues necessary are generated
via lump-sum taxation. It is further assumed that the share of consumption – resp.
aggregate output – used for public good provision is equal to the amount of public
goods Gk, k = x,z, produced from this share, i.e. Gk = µkC, µx + µz < 1. In this
case, the production functions for xi and zj modify to17
xi = Lα
xi(GxRxi)1−α and zj = Lδ
zj(GzRzj)1−δ. (45)
such that in equilibrium ˜ X and ˜ Z read
˜ X = n
1−β
β Lα




The new equilibrium values of the relative sector share and labor input in z-




δ (1 + 2aρ)










17 For (45) to be compatible with (4), one may think of (4) as a speciﬁc case of (45) with Gk = 1,
i.e. with a constant provision of public goods that is set equal to unity.
18 For the derivation of the underlying dynamic system, see Appendix D1.
15with
E1 = (1 − β(1 − δ))[β((1 − δ)αgµz − (1 − α)δgµz) + (α − δ)(αβ − 1)ρ]
E2 = (1 − β(1 − α))[β((1 − δ)αgµz − (1 − α)δgµz) + (α − δ)(δβ − 1)ρ].
Note that setting gµ = 0 does not replicate the no-policy equilibrium in this case. It



























Z − aρ (50)
where the functional forms of (49) and (50) are identical to the equilibrium conditions
for g∗
C and L∗




R = −ρ. (51)
Proposition 3. The provision of public goods raises growth independently of the level
of the consumption share devoted to productive public spending, µk, k = x,z.
Proof. For the positive eﬀect of public good provision on g
p2∗
C see Appendix E. This
positive eﬀect is independent of the level of µk for gµk = 0 as follows from (47) to
(50).
For the economic intuition behind this result, consider the case in which the policy
maker provides public goods to the less resource intensive sector only. In this case,
the feed-back eﬀect of the provision of public goods on x-production is equivalent
to a rise in x-sector productivity. This increase in productivity induces a slower
increase of intermediates’ prices in x-production which lowers proﬁtability and leads
to a reallocation of labor from x- to z-sector research. Due to the increase in z-sector
research, growth rises. In the x-sector, the reallocation of labor reduces research which
aﬀects growth negatively. But, in the aggregate this negative eﬀect is overcompensated
by the productivity increase due to public good provision.
For no-policy balanced growth (Section 3) we showed that in equilibrium the dif-
ference in research activities between the two sectors is determined by (30). This
relation remained unperturbed by the taxes and subsidies considered in the previous
subsection as neither aﬀect production technologies directly. In the case of public
good provision, however, the productivity of intermediate goods’ production increases





























Comparing (30) and (52) shows that the gap between research in the two sectors
might in- or decrease due to productive public spending, depending on the model
calibration and policy rule.
Employing the BGP relations, (47) to (51), we get the comparative statics of the
diﬀerent policy instruments.
Proposition 4. As the growth eﬀect of productive public spending is independent of
the level of µk, k = x,z (see Proposition 3), a one-time increase in µk has no impact
on long-run growth, resource extraction and the relative sector share. If, however, the




















dgµz > 0. (53)




C , as given by (47) to (51), with
respect to µk and gµk yields either zero or the signs above (see Appendix D2).
A rising share of public goods provision lowers proﬁtability in the respective sector
which leads to a reallocation of labor to the other sector.19 Due to the increase in
the research of this sector, growth rises. In the other sector, research eﬀorts decline,
but in the aggregate the induced negative growth eﬀect is again overcompensated by
continuing productivity increases.
5 Conclusions
The paper derives the long-run consequences of sectoral heterogeneity when sectors
diﬀer with respect to resource use. We have shown that sector-speciﬁc research ac-
tivities and induced innovations are crucial for the dynamic behavior of the econ-
omy. Research has to overcome the drag on growth that arises from rising resource
scarcity. Moreover, resource intensive sectors can only stay competitive if they succeed
to achieve faster research growth. According to our results, unconstrained markets
provide suﬃcient incentives to investors that this indeed happens. Most importantly,
19The increase of the share is of course limited as µx + µz < 1 has to hold. Positive growth eﬀects
which are triggered by a rising share can therefore only be temporary.
17we ﬁnd that research is biased towards resource intensive sectors and that an econ-
omy develops along a balanced growth path despite sectoral heterogeneity. By focusing
on input substitution in a multi-sector setting the paper adds to recent advances in
growth economics. Given the empirical fact of large diﬀerences in resource intensity
between the sectors and taking into account the predictions of increasing scarcities
of natural resources these results are relevant to predict the further development of
living standards. Our ﬁndings are in line with empirical results on the competitiveness
of energy-intensive industries under tight carbon policies, see Demailly and Quirion
(2008).
In the second part of the paper we analyzed the consequences of diﬀerent policies
aiming at fostering sectoral change and sustainability, i.e. raising growth and lowering
resource extraction. First, we considered the implications of traditional policy instru-
ments: subsidies and taxes. It was shown that resource taxes only raise growth and
lower resource extraction if the tax rate decreases over time. Labor subsidies, however,
are allocation neutral in our model and do no generate any real eﬀects. Subsidies on
research activities proved to be more eﬀective, with the level of subsidy rates aﬀect-
ing growth positively – independent of which sector receives the subsidies. Structural
eﬀects of policy arise as the eﬀect of research subsidization on market shares depends
on which sector is subsidized. Subsidies to research in one sector induce the relative
sector share of this sector to decrease.
Secondly, we considered the provision of productive public goods as a possible
means to raise sectoral and overall growth. We showed that the introduction of public
goods aﬀects growth directly when public good provision is tied to overall consump-
tion. In this case, productivity in the sector in which public goods are provided rises
and thereby aﬀects growth as well as sector shares. Increasing the share of consump-
tion devoted to public goods over time, induces a further positive eﬀect on growth.
The rising share lowers proﬁtability in the respective sector which leads to a realloca-
tion of labor the other sector. Due to the increase in the research of this sector, growth
rises. In the other sector, research eﬀorts decline, but in the aggregate the induced
negative growth eﬀect is again overcompensated by continuing productivity increases.
The provision of public goods proves to be an eﬀective tool to enhance growth and
simultaneously induce sectoral change.
The present analysis could be extended by realistically assuming that research in
the two sectors is subject to diﬀerent technology risks. In this case the asymmetry in
research returns could explain and justify the disproportionate investment in resource
extensive sectors as it is required from institutional investors in some countries (see
also Bretschger and Pittel 2005 on this topic). In the present set-up, the overpropor-
tional investment in the resource extensive sector would simply be crowded out by an
18adjustment of non-regulated investment towards the resource intensive sector. This
analysis, however, is left for future research.
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6 Appendix
A. No policy scenario
A1. Derivation of dynamic system
To derive the equation of motion for LZ, (17), substitute intermediates proﬁts, (7),
into the no-arbitrage condition for the patent market, (11), which gives
gVn = r − (1 − β)
˜ φ





The equilibrium condition for the research sector, (10), implies gVn = gw − gn.
Substituting the latter as well as (10) into (54) and considering furthermore that from



















As (5) implies gw = gC −gLX + 1
1+˜ φg˜ φ and we have (16) from consumer optimization,
(55) can be rewritten as
gC − gLX +
1
1 + ˜ φ






21From (5) we also know LX = α
δ
˜ φLZ which implies gLX = g˜ φ + gLZ. Employing these










1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ − gLZ. (57)










1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ − gLZ. (58)
Adding (57) to (58) and rearranging gives










1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ − 2ρ. (59)
By considering that from the equilibrium condition for the labor market, (9), it follows
that Ln + Lm = 1 − (1 + α
δ













(1 + 2aρ) −
˜ φ




To get an expression for ˙ ˜ φ ﬁrst consider that from (3) and the production technologies
















Consideration of LX = α
δ



















Diﬀerentiating (62) with respect to time and expressing the resulting expression in
growth rates gives after substituting gn = Ln







(Ln − Lm) + (α − δ)(gLX − gRX). (63)
For the diﬀerence in the input of labor in the two types of R&D it follows from (57)
and (58) that






Furthermore, (5), (14) and (16) imply that gRX = 1
1+˜ φg˜ φ − ρ. By substituting this
relation as well as (64) into (63), we get
1
ν − 1







LZ + (α − δ)(gLX −
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
g˜ φ + ρ). (65)
22Recalling gLX = g˜ φ + gLZ and (17) ﬁnally gives (18):



























A2. Balanced growth path
From (60) and (66) the BGP values of LZ and ˜ φ can be obtained by setting ˙ LZ = ˙ ˜ φ = 0
which gives (19) and (20). Considering furthermore that ˙ LZ = 0, we get the BGP
labor shares in the two research sectors, (24) and (25), from (57) and (58).
A3. Stability
To check for the stability properties of the system, we derive the Jacobian of (17) and
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It can be shown that
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1−β
























with detD ≷ 0 for ν ≷ 1 and trD > 0 for ν > 1. As tr = EV1 + EV2 and det =
EV1   EV2 (with EV1 and EV2 being the eigenvalues of the system), one eigenvalue is
negative for det < 0 while for det > 0 and tr > 0 both eigenvalues are positive. Since
our system contains one jump variable and one predetermined variable, the economy
is saddle-path stable for ν < 1.
B. Generalization of results
Let us shortly consider the case of additional heterogeneity with respect to the gains of
specialization. Recall that when sectors only diﬀer with respect to research intensities,
(30) describes how BGP research is aﬀected by sectoral heterogeneity. This equation








n = (α − δ)ρ (69)
23with βx and βz representing the gains of specialization in sector x and z respectively.
Higher gains of specialization in the sector x (i.e. βz > βx) would therefore imply an
even stronger bias towards z-research.
Note that research productivities do not enter (30) and (69). Sectoral diﬀerences
in a aﬀect the labor input in each research sector as well as the allocation of labor
between research and intermediates (and thereby the levels of gn and gm). They do,
however, not aﬀect the functional relationship between gn and gm.
C. Policy analysis 1
C1. Derivation of dynamic system
The policy maker can employ three types of instruments: resource taxes, research
subsidies and labor subsidies. The governmental budget constraint reads
τpRR = smwLm + snwLn + sww + T, sn,sm,sw < 1 (70)
where τ, sn, sm denote the resource tax rate and the subsidy rates on x- and z-sector
research respectively. sw is the subsidy rate on labor. T denotes lump-sum taxation
or subsidization of households that balance the government’s budget at every point in
time.
The proﬁt function of the individual intermediate producer in the x-sector reads
after taxation and subsidization
Πxi = pxixi − ¯ τpRRxi − ¯ swwLxi (71)
and equivalent for producers in sector z. Please note that for notational convenience
we denote ¯ τ = 1+τ and ¯ sw = 1−sw. It is assumed that individual producers do not
take account of the eﬀect of their production on public good provision, such that the
modiﬁed ﬁrst-order conditions for labor and resource input are given by
Lxi = αβ
˜ φ
1 + ˜ φ
C
¯ sww
and Rxi = αβ
˜ φ




and ﬁrms’ equilibrium proﬁts are still equal to (7).
The research ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions in case of labor and research subsidies read
Πl = pVl˙ l − ¯ sl¯ swwLl, l = n,m (73)
where ¯ sl = 1 − sl and it is assumed that the research subsidy is paid on the basis of
the wage bill after labor subsidization. In equilibrium the value of a patent has again





24Proceeding as in Appendix A1 we get a modiﬁed system of diﬀerential equations






















(g¯ sm + g¯ sn) −
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(α − δ) −
1 − β
β
(g¯ sm − g¯ sn) +
1
2
(α − δ)(g¯ sm + g¯ sn + 2g¯ τ)
 
(ν − 1)˜ φ. (76)
The BGP values of ˜ φ and LZ, (35) and (36), follow from (75) and (76) by considering
that along the balanced path g˜ φ = gLZ = 0. The system is again saddle-path stable
for ν < 1.
C2. Comparative statics
Using the BGP values of ˜ φ, gR and gC we can derive the comparative statics results
for the three policy instruments where we denote20








As ¯ si = 1 − si, i = n,m, and ¯ τ = 1 + τ we get g¯ si = − si
1−sigsi and g¯ τ = τ
1+τgτ such
that d¯ si
dsi = −1 and d¯ τ





dgτ > 0. The comparative statics
































































(1−β)2(2(1−β)+β(α¯ sn+δ¯ sm))(−G1) which
is positive for an interior equilibrium, such that G1 < 0.
25d˜ φp1∗
dgsm









(1 − β)δ¯ sm





























































Note that M = [(1 − β)(1 + 2aρ − 2ag¯ sn) − aβ(α − δ)(ρ + g¯ τ)] > 0, as claimed for
d˜ φp1∗
dgsm < 0, can be proofed as follows: It was shown that G1 = aD1−A < 0 for L
p1∗
Z > 0
(see Footnote 6). From ˜ φp1∗ = ¯ sn
¯ sm
A−aD1
B−aD2 > 0, this implies that also B − aD2 > 0.
Now it can be shown that
(A − aC) − (1 − β)M = −aβδ¯ smK (77)
(B − aD) − (1 − β)M = a(2(1 − β) + αβ¯ sn)K (78)
with K = ((1 − β)(g¯ sn − g¯ sm) + (α − δ)(g¯ τ + ρ)). As A − aD1 > 0 and B − aD2 > 0,
it follows from (77) and (78) that M < 0 is not feasible, as in this case RHSs of the
above two equations would have to be simultaneously positive.
D. Policy analysis 2
D1. Derivation of dynamic system
To endogenize C in (46), express (2) in terms of ˜ X, resp. ˜ Z, only. Recall that
˜ Z = ˜ φ
ν
1−ν ˜ X follows from (3), such that (2) reads
C =
 






1 + ˜ φ
  ν
ν−1 ˜ Z. (79)
26Inserting (79) into (46) and rearranging gives
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˙ ˜ φ =
(ν − 1)(1 + ˜ φ)



















(α + δ) − αδ
 





The BGP values of ˜ φ and LZ, (47) and (48), follow from (82) and (83) by considering
that along the balanced path g˜ φ = gLZ = 0. As in the policy scenario 1 and the
no-policy case, the system is saddle-path stable for ν < 1.
D2. Comparative statics




C , as given by (47) to (51), with respect to
µk and gµk gives:
d˜ φp2∗
dgµx
= −(1 − α)δ












(1 − β + αβ)H2 > 0
d˜ φp2∗
dgµz
= (1 − δ)α












(1 − β + δβ)H2 > 0
with
H1 = (δB − aE2)2 > 0
H2 =
aβ
(1 − β)((α + δ)(1 − β) + β(α2 + δ2)
> 0.
27E. Proof of Proposition 3
Due to the productivity eﬀect of public goods, labor inputs in x- and z-sector research
change as follows compared to the no-policy scenario (assuming that gµk = 0, k = x,z):
Lp2∗
n − L∗
n = (1 − β + δβ)Ω (84)
Lp2∗
m − L∗
m = −(1 − β + αβ)Ω (85)






i.e. a policy induced rise in Ln (resp. Lm) has to be accompanied by a decline of Lm
(resp. Ln).
Furthermore, public good provision modiﬁes the sectoral equilibrium growth rates



































m were unchanged compared to the no-policy scenario, this would imply
g∗
˜ X < g
p2
˜ X < g
p2
˜ Z where the relation g
p2
˜ X < g
p2
˜ Z is not compatible with BGP growth (see
(27)). Therefore (87) and (88) together with (86) imply that a post-policy BGP with
g ˜ X = g ˜ Z = gC can only be compatible with L
p2∗
n − L∗
n > 0 and L
p2∗
m − L∗
m < 0. From
(87) we see that this increase in Ln raises growth.
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